MARINERS UPDATE

VOYAGE : 10

30 June 2026



YOUR WEEKLY MARITIME BRIEFING

Receive our **FREE** weekly e-magazine featuring maritime news, safety insights, weather education, compliance updates, and practical knowledge—delivered directly to your inbox every week.

MARITIME NEWS | SAFETY INSIGHTS | WEATHER EDUCATION | COMPLIANCE UPDATES | PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE | EXPERT GUIDANCE

SCAN TO SUBSCRIBE

OR

CLICK THE ICON BELOW TO REGISTER INSTANTLY

TABLE OF CONTENTS

EDITOR'S NOTE

WELCOME TO THE 10TH EDITION

Dear Mariners,

The maritime industry is evolving at an unprecedented pace, and with every new regulation, enforcement action, or major casualty, one message becomes increasingly clear: compliance is no longer optional – it is operationally critical.

In this issue, we focus on two subjects that every ship owner, operator, manager, charterer, and seafarer should understand.

The first explores how to identify whether a vessel, its owner, or its operator appears on international sanctions lists using freely available public databases. In today's geopolitical environment, conducting sanctions due diligence before fixing a vessel or engaging with a counterparty is no longer just good practice – it is an essential step in protecting companies from financial, legal, and reputational risks.

Our second feature examines the recent criminal indictment following the MV DALI casualty and the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge.

While the legal proceedings are ongoing and all allegations remain subject to due process, the case highlights important lessons for the maritime community.

Equipment modifications, redundancy of critical systems, Safety Management System compliance, accurate reporting, transparent record-keeping, and ethical conduct during inspections are not merely regulatory requirements -- they are the foundations of safe ship operations.

Our heartfelt thanks to Capt Ian MacLean LLM MBA AFNI.

We encourage every reader to reflect on the lessons shared in this edition and ask a simple question:

Are our systems, procedures, and people truly prepared for today's regulatory and operational challenges?

Stay informed. Stay compliant. Stay safe.

Editor
Mariners Update

Scan to Save our V card

WK 19: 2ND MATE NOT FAMILIAR WITH GMDSS

A vessel was detained under Code 30 after the Second Officer failed to demonstrate familiarity with GMDSS radio operation during a Port State Control inspection — responding with a voice call instead of conducting a DSC test. Despite the PSC Authority concluding that the detention was justified, the ship's management appealed the decision, presenting evidence that three other qualified GMDSS officers were on board, that DSC tests had been successfully logged, and that the coast radio station confirmed all test transmissions were received correctly.

The MOU Panel reviewed the case and unanimously found the detention unjustified. With no strong evidence that the Second Officer's lapse made the vessel unsafe, and with the correct regulatory reference identified as an ISM familiarisation issue rather than a SOLAS violation, the Panel directed the Port State Authority to downgrade the detention from Code 30 to Code 17. The lesson is clear — maintain your equipment, follow correct procedures, keep accurate records, and stay composed during inspections.

Want to dive deeper? Simply click the image above or scan the QR code below.

A comprehensive 3-day at-sea Pre-SIRE 2.0 inspection was conducted to evaluate the vessel's preparedness for an upcoming Chevron OCIMF SIRE 2.0 inspection. The assessment covered key operational areas including bridge operations, emergency procedures, deck operations, cargo control room practices, engine department readiness, and engine room condition. Overall, the vessel demonstrated a good level of compliance, with an overall readiness score of 8.4/10, reflecting strong operational performance and competent crew knowledge.

The inspection also identified several focus areas requiring attention, including SMS reference familiarity, ENC update procedures, defect management documentation, risk assessment linkage, and Permit to Work (PTW) awareness. Addressing these observations through targeted training, improved documentation, and practical demonstrations will further strengthen inspection readiness and help ensure a successful SIRE 2.0 outcome

To explore this topic in detail, click on the above image or scan the QR code below.

Effective 1 July 2026, Phase 3 of RightShip's Inspection Age Trigger comes into force — and the threshold has moved closer than many operators may expect. Dry Bulk and General Cargo vessels aged 11 years and older are now required to hold a valid RightShip Inspection. Without one, Safety Scores are automatically downgraded to 2 out of 5, and the vessel cannot pass a RightShip Vetting Nomination — directly impacting commercial trading opportunities.

For owners and managers, the action window is now. Vessels built in 2015 or earlier that have not yet been inspected should be prioritised immediately. RightShip's Hybrid Inspection model offers a practical solution — with documentation reviewed in advance, on-board inspection time is reduced to just 8 to 10 hours, minimising crew disruption while meeting the requirement in full.

To explore this topic in detail, click on the above image or scan the QR code below.





The Sun is the Earth's primary source of energy, but not every part of the planet receives the same amount of heating. This week's Captain's Weather Desk explains how the angle of the Sun's rays, atmospheric thickness, and different surface types influence the amount of solar energy absorbed. You'll also learn why direct sunlight produces greater heating than slanting sunlight and how these differences affect temperatures across the globe.

The notes further explore why land and sea respond differently to solar radiation, and how factors such as latitude, seasons, prevailing winds, ocean currents, and upwelling contribute to variations in air temperature and weather conditions. Understanding these principles provides a strong foundation for interpreting meteorological patterns, particularly in the maritime environment.

To explore this topic in detail, click on the above image or scan the QR code below.



MARINERS UPDATE - YOUR TRUSTED MARITIME PARTNER

Your trusted maritime partner for professional marine inspection and survey solutions designed to improve vessel safety, operational efficiency, and regulatory compliance.



Scan this QR code or click the link below to Download our all services Brochure

CLICK HERE

MARINER'S UPDATE
COMPLIANCE WITH SIMPLICITY
mu@marinersupdate.com www.marinersupdate.com +91 7200 163 695

THE DALI CRIMINALIZATION - WHAT EVERY SEAFARER, SUPERINTENDENT, MANAGER AND OWNER NEEDS TO KNOW.

Captain Ian MacLean Master Mariner LLM MBA AFNI · 2nd

Accredited mediator | Consulting master mariner (ISM, due diligence & casualty) and non-practising solicitor | Former trade association director / IMO delegate / ship manager / vessel SPV director.

Federal prosecutors have issued a 47-page indictment following the collapse of the Francis Scott Key Bridge in Baltimore, (the Bridge). The 18 charges include, (a) conspiracy, (b) failure to report hazardous conditions, (c) misconduct or neglect resulting in death, (d) obstruction, (e) making false statements to federal officials in the course of an investigation, (f) falsification of inspection certificates including an attempt to purchase a fake inspection certificate (g) providing forged documents to a Grand Jury (h) misrepresenting the condition of the vessel to Class to obtain a Safety Construction Certificate and (h) violations of the Clean Water Act among others. It is alleged that some issues date back to 2000, on both the Dali and two other vessels. These charges flow initially from the status of the vessel and the blackouts that occurred while alongside and underway shortly before the vessel contacted the bridge.

It is important to bear in mind that at present these are only allegations and all the text that follows in this article is based on the allegations in the indictment and the content of the NTSB report into the casualty.

All involved, whether individuals or corporate entities, are entitled to a fair trial with the presumption of innocence. It should also be noted that the narrative below being based on the indictment, reflects only what the prosecution is alleging at present. It does not address the extent to which the assertions made by the prosecution are misplaced, incorrect or to which there is a full and complete defence. It should be remembered that this is a highly politicized event and there will no doubt have been pressure on the federal attorneys to prosecute. (I should highlight I am not a marine engineer or a ship's electrical officer and would welcome any correction, clarification or additional content from those that are).

As this article is not about culpability, but rather the lessons that can be learned, names and ranks/positions are not identified, rather reference is made to, "the Defendants" which will encompass those corporate entities and individuals mentioned in the indictment, and those referred to as "co-conspirators" who are not named or identified within this specific indictment. We do know that one shipboard officer not named in this indictment has offered a guilty plea, and it is assumed that his indictment remains under seal. There may well be other indictments under seal.

I thought the blackout alongside was for a completely different reason to the one underway, and that the underway blackout was due to a loose wire that wasn't known about and could not have reasonably been known about?

That is correct. Two different blackouts (one alongside and one while departing) for two different reasons. But in each case the first blackout was followed a few seconds later by another blackout, which in both cases occurred for a common reason, fuel starvation.

The initial blackouts are not the focus of the prosecution, but rather the second two blackouts are, which related to the vessel's inability to automatically recover from the first blackout, namely the failure of fuel system that should have automatically operated to maintain electrical power to the vessel.

As an aside, the vessel has four auxiliary engines for the main electrical power supply. Each of the four auxiliary engines drives an alternator attached to that individual engine. Collectively, an auxiliary engine and its associated alternator is known as a generator. The vessel had four generators. This electricity is needed, for example, to run the fuel oil and cooling water pumps for the main engine, the steering, lighting, refrigeration etc. Without an electrical supply to its pumps, the main engine will shut down and the vessel will have no steering.

Generators require a pressurised fuel supply which is provided by fuel and booster pumps. Redundancy is achieved by the pumps being configured to automatically restart should they stop for any reason, for example, the power being cut off. In addition, there is a requirement for there to be a second set of pumps that automatically take over from the first set of pumps should either one or both of the pumps in use fail. Vessels are designed, maintained and operated with this redundancy in place so that an interruption in the electrical supply to the vessel's electrical consumers is rapidly rectified and navigational integrity maintained.

Class and Flag State require this redundancy to be in place as a pre-condition of the vessel's certification. The indictment alleges the required redundancy wasn't present, the prosecutors say, because a flushing pump was being used to provide fuel to two of the vessel's four generators and that the flushing pump lacked the necessary redundancy.

What is a flushing pump and what is its relevance?

We need first to look at the generators. Not all four need to be running at the same time. Depending on the load, one may be sufficient during a sea passage. During pilotage and in close proximity to navigational hazards it would be usual to run two generators. (It is likely given the vessel had a bow thruster a second generator was necessary in any event to cope with the likely power demand).

In addition, we need to understand how the power is managed. There is usually a non-operating generator on standby. If this non-operating generator is set to an automatic start status, (which is usual practice) and the vessel's Power Management System (PMS) which continually monitors the electrical environment, detects a problem, it automatically starts the standby generator. More on that below.

So far as the generators are concerned, there were two separate fuel oil systems:

Main Engine Fuel Oil System
This supplied fuel to the main engine and to generators 1 and 2.

Generator Fuel Oil System
This supplied fuel to generators 3 and 4.

The Flushing Pump
The purpose of a flushing pump is to clear the fuel lines in the generator fuel system prior to maintenance. Diesel oil is "pushed" through the system to displace the heavier fuel oil that powers the generators. One flushing pump serves all four generators.

From 2020 until the time of the casualty (March 2024), the flushing pump was used to provide fuel to generators 3 and 4. This meant that generators 3 and 4 could only run on diesel, and not the cheaper very low sulphur fuel oil, (VLSFO).

Why is using a flushing pump for the generators an issue?

It's a good question. Unlike the system that should have been in use, the flushing pump (a) is not designed to restart automatically following a power loss, (b) does not have a standby pump that automatically takes over in case of the loss of the operating pump, (c) cannot be started remotely from the engine control room, (d) its use for providing fuel to the generators was in breach of Class and Flag State regulations, and (e) its use was in breach of the Defendant's own Safety Management System as mandated by the ISM Code.

The indictment notes that the Defendants had been using a flushing pump in the same manner on at least two other vessels since 2020. On one vessel there had been a blackout in 2022. Generator 2 was in use and experienced a low lubricating oil pressure alarm. To protect itself, the generator automatically shut down and there was a temporary black out. The PMS started the standby generator, number 3. However, the PMS was not configured to start the flushing pump, and the other pumps were isolated. Generator 3 started with the fuel that was in the system but then stopped as the flushing pump failed to automatically provide further fuel. These two blackouts were reported to the Defendants with an explanation that the second blackout was caused by the flushing pump.

I understood that the blackout alongside was caused by an exhaust damper being closed by error and the generator shutting itself down. A simple error that wouldn't attract criminal charges?

That's correct. It was widely reported at the time and many, me included, thought there was no connection the blackout that occurred alongside, and the blackout that caused the casualty.

At the time, while alongside, generator 2 was in use. In error, during maintenance, the damper in the exhaust was closed. As a result, there was a pressure back-up in the exhaust system causing the generator to protect itself by shutting down.

As is usual, there was a non-operating generator on standby, in this case generator 3. As this non-operating generator was set to an automatic start status, the vessel's Power Management System (PMS) which continually monitors the electrical environment, detected the problem with generator 2 and automatically started the standby generator.

The residual fuel in the system ran the generator for five minutes, but as the flushing pump had not been manually started and no further fuel was being provided, the generator became starved of fuel and there was a second blackout as generator 3 shut down. It is this second blackout that is a feature of the indictment.

The Defendant's SMS required that following a blackout, an investigation be documented, recorded in the logbook, reported to the terminal and the USCG. None of these steps were taken. The vessel did report the dual blackout to the Defendants on 25 March, the day before the casualty, but no report was made to the relevant authorities and no further action taken.

OK, all that's understood, but as mentioned above, the casualty on departure was because of a loose wire, not something that was known about?

Again, that's correct. The first blackout was due to a loose wire. And in fairness it took the NTSB a long time to identify this as the cause. I don't believe a reasonable observer could suggest that the failure to identify the lose wire was a crew error. However, as foreshadowed above, this was followed by a second blackout. A little background to the vessel's electrical system will assist to understand what happened.

The four generators provide electricity to the vessel's electrical consumers through two switchboards, the High Voltage (HV) switchboard and Low Voltage (LV) switchboard. The HV switchboard powers the high-powered equipment, for example the lubricating oil pumps for the main engine (without which the main engine cannot run) and the bow thruster.

There is then a supply line from the HV switchboard to the LV switchboard through a step-down transformer. The LV switchboard then distributes power to the relatively low-powered equipment, such as the lighting system, steering gear pumps, main engine cooling water pumps, main engine fuel pumps, the bow thruster auxiliary pumps (without which the bow thruster cannot run even though the thruster itself takes power from the HV switchboard) and the flushing pump. The main engine is configured to auto shut down when the cooling water pumps stop.

To provide redundancy in the case of a failure, there are two circuits connecting the two switchboards each with its own step-down transformer meaning that if one fails for any reason, the other can be utilized. Only one is in use at any given time.

There are number of circuit breakers. If there is a problem, the PMS will “trip” or “open” the circuit breaker to protect the electrical consumers from damage such as voltage variations, overloads, short circuits or ground faults. Once the PMS is content all is well, the breaker can be closed and power restored. The breakers can be set to automatic or manual. When on automatic, once the PMS is satisfied it is safe to do so, it closes the breaker. If the breaker is set to manual, a crew member will have to physically close the breaker. The breakers were set to “manual” at the time of the casualty. (Informatively, there was no statutory or Class requirement for the breakers to be set to automatic.)

So, what went wrong to cause the contact with the Bridge?

We can’t answer that question. There were several events prior to the Bridge contact. What we don’t know, is whether if we were to remove some of those events collectively or together, the casualty would still have occurred. So, we can’t say if the casualty was inevitable from the first blackout and contact with the bridge would have occurred irrespective of what happened next, or whether subsequent events contributed to, or caused, the casualty.

What, then, are the material events?

On departure from the berth, generators 3 and 4 were providing electricity to the vessel and the flushing pump was providing the fuel supply to the generators. The main engine was on bridge control. Generator 2 was on standby, ready to automatically take over should generators 3 and 4 fail for any reason. The vessel commenced its outbound voyage under the guidance of a pilot. Shortly after leaving the berth, the tugs were dismissed.

Note the following timings ae based on the NTSB report, not the indictment.

01:25:00 (C-4:09)

A signal wire in the switchboard likely temporarily lost contact causing a breaker to the LV switchboard to open which resulted in a LV blackout. The vessel was about 3.3 ship’s lengths from the Bridge and travelling at 8.9 knots. Steering was lost along with other electrical consumers as the LV circuits shut down.

As part of the PMS, there is an Undervoltage Release (the UVR). This acts as a protection causing the breaker to trip or open, shutting off all the power, when the supply voltage drops below a specific pre-set threshold. This is because a low voltage can cause equipment to malfunction or cause damage.

The “wire” was part of a 110-volt DC instrumentation and control circuit for the UVR. The system worked by “holding” the breaker closed so long as this circuit remained energised and signalled it was safe for the breaker to be closed. The PMS would “instruct” the breaker to trip, when detecting an issue, by de-energising the circuit. However, the breaker would also trip if the circuit became de-energised for some other reason, in this case the wire connection that kept the circuit “live” temporarily disconnecting.

Although the HV switchboard was still connected to the bow thruster, as mentioned above, the bow thruster could not run as the auxiliary pumps required to operate it were supplied by the LV switchboard. (Had the breakers been in automatic mode, the breaker would have closed within 10 seconds, restoring power to the LV switchboard).

The flushing pump providing fuel to generators 3 and 4, which was powered by the LV switchboard, also stopped, though generators 3 and 4 continued to run and feed the HV switchboard as there was residual fuel in the system and they were able to operate for a while without the flushing pump delivering further fuel.

01:25:08 (C-4:01)

The loss of LV power caused the main engine to shut down after a short delay as there was no power supply to the engine cooling water pump. As detailed above the loss of the cooling water pump is an automatic shutdown condition for the main engine. The short delay was to allow the crew to activate an override button to prevent the main engine’s automatic shutdown if it was appropriate to do so.

01:25:58 (C-3:11)

Following a rapid trouble shooting exercise, the crew manually closed the breaker from the HV switchboard to the step-down transformer and normal LV switchboard services resumed with a sequential series of starts on the vessel’s electrical equipment. This is usual as starting all equipment at the same time would lead to an overload. It should be mentioned though, that the main engine was never restarted. This would have required returning the telegraph to stop and moving the telegraph lever to an ahead or astern gate. The main engine does not automatically re-start following a black out. Steering was however regained.

01:26:10 (C-2:29)

The emergency generator connected with the emergency switchboard and limited steering was regained using steering pump 3. The rudder was ordered to port.

01:26:42 (C-02:27)

The vessel had restored all the power necessary to navigate the vessel, apart from the flushing pump which needed to be manually re-started.

Generators 3 and 4 were still running on the residual fuel in their system, but with the flushing pump still off, the fuel starvation caused the generators to slow.

01:27:02 (C-02:07)

As generators 3 and 4 slowed, the vessel’s PMS detected a drop in the electrical frequency from the alternators. Because of this, the PMS started generator 2 automatically.

However, before the PMS could synchronise the alternators, the PMS detected the underperformance of generators 3 and 4 disconnected those generators and tripped the breakers at the step-down transformer resulting in an HV and LV blackout.

The emergency switchboard remained powered, so steering pump 3 remained operative as did the lighting and other equipment attached to the emergency switchboard.

01:27:07 (C-2:02)

Generator 2 started a couple of seconds later. Power was restored to the HV switchboard. However, the breakers feeding the LV switchboard were still open, so the LV switchboard remained blacked out. Because of this, there was no power for the fuel pumps and generator 2 was running only on the fuel in its system. In addition, this breaker was set to manual recovery rather than automatic recovery. It took a further 20 seconds for the crew to close the breaker and restore electrical power to the switchboard.

01:27:36 (C-1:33)

Power was restored to the LV switchboard, and a series of sequential starts was initiated on the vessel's electrical equipment.

01:27:56 (C-1:13)

The crewman sent to start the flushing pump re-started it.

01:28:20 (C-0:49) (Time from indictment).

All power was restored to enable the navigation of the vessel, with the fuel oil supply and booster pumps that supplied fuel to the main engine and generator 2 automatically restarting.

01:29:09 (C-0)

The vessel contacted the bridge. (The indictment records contact as 01:29:15, the NTSB report records this 01:29:09).

The NTSB concluded that had the generator supply and booster pump been in use for generators 3 and 4, rather than the flushing pump, the second blackout would not have occurred.

What about the emergency generator, isn't that supposed to operate automatically?

It's a good question. In the NTSB report it was noted that after the initial blackout, the emergency diesel generator (EDG) took 70 seconds to engage, not the 45 seconds required by international regulations.

As part of the auto-start sequence, the EDG's radiator damper, which controlled air flow through the radiator to regulate the EDG's temperature, should have received a signal to open. Once a limit switch within the damper's actuator detected that the damper was open, the EDG should have started, come up to speed, and connected to the emergency switchboard automatically.

Any delay in the opening of the radiator damper (or its limit switch indicating it as not open) would postpone the start of the EDG, prolonging the time before the emergency switchboard could be powered. The NTSB conclusion was that EDG radiator damper actuator's limit switch did not indicate "open" in the required time due to unknown circumstances. The NTSB were unable to replicate the problem. They did conclude though that the EDG had been set to automatic start, as in their view it would not have been possible for a crewmember to make their way to the EDG room and manually start the EDG in 70 seconds.

It is probably worth mentioning that the emergency generator could not, in any event, produce enough electrical power to operate the auxiliary pumps necessary to run the main engine and neither do the regulations require this.

Anything else to know about the casualty?

An issue arises in the context of the automatic low cooling water pressure shut down on the main engine. By way of reminder the main engine cooling water pump takes its power from the low voltage switchboard so it would have stopped at the time of the LV blackout.

Such an automatic shutdown is not a requirement pursuant to international or the vessel's Flag State regulations, or indeed a US requirement.

This shut down was a requirement of the Class society that supervised and classed the vessel when she was built. By the time of the casualty, the vessel had changed to another class society, and this new class society did not require the auto shut down, but it remained in place.

The NTSB highlighted in their report that there was an override button which if pressed within six seconds of the LV blackout, would have stopped the low cooling water pressure shut down from activating and the main engine would have continued to operate.

On a personal note, I would be reluctant to criticize the crew for not operating the override, especially in this time frame. Moreover, this override function could only be performed at the station that was controlling the main engine at the time the alarm shutdown was triggered, which at the time was on the bridge. I would question whether those on the bridge would have sufficient knowledge to know they could safely operate that override button.

In addition, the NTSB report is silent as to the ability of the main engine to run without an electrical supply to the fuel oil pumps which is an issue that could have been addressed in the report, if only to note the length of time the main engine could have been expected to run without a pressurised fuel supply.

Lastly, there was no exploration in the NTSB report as to whether the crew on the bridge considered trying to start the main engine by moving the telegraph lever to stop and then ahead to obtain a water flow over the rudder. That said, once again I would hesitate to criticize the crew for not doing this, as typically there is a wait for confirmation from the engine room as to the actions to take. Would it have been a different matter if the main engine had been on engine room control? I do think these are issues that could have been more fully addressed in the NTSB report in the context of training deck officers in engine management in post black out scenarios.

The NTSB did conclude that the crew's response to the first blackout underway was, "timely," but that had the control modes on the breakers been set to automatic, the first blackout would have been 48 seconds shorter providing more opportunity to use the steering and engine.

Notably, the NTSB did not simulate this to determine whether contact with the bridge could have been avoided, had either (a) the second blackout not occurred or (b) the breakers had been set to automatic, which may come as a disappointment to fans of the film, “Sully” in the context of the detailed simulations run there.

You mentioned “false statements” in the indictment, what were those?

Without going into the specifics of those in the shoreside of the operation, the flowing is identified in the indictment:

1. It was falsely stated that the defendants were unaware that the flushing pump was being used for fuel supply to generators 3 and 4.
2. It was falsely stated the switchboard was inspected every five years with the most recent in drydock in 2020.
3. As stated above, the flushing pump can only supply diesel oil. It was falsely stated by the defendants that it was not known whether VLSFO was used to power generators 3 and 4.
4. It was falsely stated by the defendants that they did not know that two other vessels under their control were using the flushing pump as the primary fuel supply for generators 3 and 4.

It is a federal felony during an investigation to make false statements to an agency such as the NTSB or USCG. This can result in up to five years imprisonment. It is offence to knowingly and wilfully, (a) falsify, conceal, or cover up a material fact by any trick, scheme, or device, and/or (b) make any materially false, fictitious, or fraudulent statement or representation, and/or (c) make or use any false writing or document knowing it contains materially false information.
The false information must be material to an investigation and capable of influencing or affecting the investigation and the individual must know that the statement was untrue at the time that it was made. We discuss this further below

You also mentioned the indictment was for a conspiracy, how was there a conspiracy?

Under U.S. federal law, a conspiracy is an agreement between two or more people to commit an illegal act or to achieve a legal goal using illegal means, coupled with an intent to commit the offense and, in most cases, an overt act taken in furtherance of the plan. It may be that for example, a superintendent in Europe telling a chief engineer on a ship in the US to falsify an Oil Record Book would be a conspiracy.

In this case, it is alleged that material safety information was concealed from regulatory authorities, including the USCG, the Flag State, Class and the Charterer to ensure that company vessels could do business in the US ports and waters without delay, interference, or detention. It is probably easier to detail the manner of the “conspiracy” on this case, which is documented as follows:

1.Failure to use a fuel system with redundancy for generators 3 and 4.

2.In breach of US law, operating the vessel and two other vessels in US waters with generators 3 and 4 using a flushing pump.

3.In breach of US law, while doing business in US ports and waters, concealed and failed to the notify the USCG of (a) conditions of class, (b) marine casualties, and (c) hazardous conditions.

4.Concealed the use of the flushing pump by omitting and removing mention of it from ship's documents, internal audits, handover notes, arrival forms submitted to the USCG, blackout procedures, checklists and drills.

5.Failure to seek Class or Flag State approval for use of the flushing pump.

6.Seeking approval from the USCG to operate three vessels in US waters based on Class approval for a fuel system that was not in use.

7.Failure to perform a risk assessment in respect of use of the flushing pump.

8.Misled the charterer about the flushing pump use resulting in the charterer purchasing more expensive fuel than would otherwise have been necessary.

9.The defendants procured false, forged and fraudulent inspection certificates in respect of electrical equipment creating the false impression the vessels were being operated and maintained safely and properly, and that such certificates were zip tied to equipment where the USCG would view them during inspections.

10.The defendants submitted to Class false, forged and fictitious testing and inspection certificates certifying that maintenance had been performed on the three vessels on certain items of electrical equipment for the three vessels.

11.The defendants concealed and attempted to conceal the conspiracy.

It is worth expanding on some of these allegations.

Class will permit certain inspections to be undertaken by the vessel and reported to them as part of a rolling programme. The defendants reported the fuel and booster pumps for generators 3 and 4 had been opened, inspected, and that they were in order and "running satisfactorily."

In fact, they were not in use and incapable of being used at that time. Based, in part, on this report, Class issued a Cargo Ship Safety Construction Certificate on behalf of the Flag State certifying that the condition of the structure, machinery and equipment was satisfactory, and the vessel complied with SOLAS.

With respect to electrical items, the defendants procured or attempted to procure false inspection certificates for the main switch board electrical breakers stating they had been inspected and tested when no such inspections or tests had been undertaken.

The defendants sent the following message:

- *"If possible, discuss with the yard if they can just provide a certificate (no need to do actual test) of test carried out to submit to Class. You can just check and negotiate for say 100 USD for the certificate. Please try and convince the yard."*

The vendor subsequently advised:

- *"You should know that issue the certificate without actual test is base on the trust, it is a risk if the ACBs (Air Circuit Breakers) have issue in the future. My company doesn't allow to issue certificate under this situation." (sic).*

Fake certificates were eventually provided and zip tied to the switchboard as well as being provided to Class. Similar fake certificates were procured for other vessels. The fake certificates were provided by the defendants, during the investigation, to the NTSB as “evidence” of the testing and inspection regime. In addition, fake certificates for each of the alternator breakers and bow thruster breaker were sent, via counsel, to the Grand Jury as evidence.

A fake inspection certificate was also made up for another vessel for the bow thruster, where the defendants sent the vessel a certificate issued elsewhere and instructed the crew to make their own copy. The same procedure was used in respect of the inspection and repair of steering gear when no such repair had been performed.

So, that’s the conspiracy, what are the other 17 indictments?

To go through them in turn:

Count 1 – Conspiracy - As detailed above.
Count 2 – Failure to report a hazardous condition pursuant to the Port & Waterways Safety Act in respect of a deficient fuel system for generators 3 and 4 when calling at Baltimore on 19 September 2023.
Count 3 – Failure to report a hazardous condition pursuant to the Port & Waterways Safety Act in respect of a deficient fuel system for generators 3 and 4 when calling at Baltimore on 20 December 2023.
Count 4 – Failure to report a hazardous condition pursuant to the Port & Waterways Safety Act in respect of a deficient fuel system for generators 3 and 4 when calling at Baltimore on 23 March 2024.
Count 5 – Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death.
Count 6 – Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death.
Count 7 – Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death.
Count 8 – Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death.
Count 9 – Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death.
Count 10 – Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death.
Count 11 – Obstruction of an agency proceeding, (see above in respect of the defendant’s post casualty interviews).
Count 12 – On 6 June 2024, obstruction of an agency proceeding, (see above in respect of the provision of false inspection certificates for the NTSB).
Count 13 – On 23 March 2024, making of false statements, arriving in Baltimore with fake inspection certificates.
Count 14 – On 6 June 2024, making false statements, providing false inspection certificates to the NTSB.
Count 15 – On 18 October, providing falsified certificates to a Grand Jury.
Count 16 – Discharge of pollution in breach of the Clean Water Act.
Count 17 – Discharge of harmful quantity of oil in breach of the Clean Water Act.
Count 18 – Discharge of refuse and pollutants, into the Patapsco River, including at least 16,000 tons of steel, 10,000 tons of concrete and 7 vehicles, without a permit issued by the Army Corps of Engineers.

What are the grounds for the charge of, "Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death." There are ten grounds in the Indictment as follows:

1. Failure to notify the USCG (a) that the supply and booster pumps designed to provide fuel for (generators) 3 and 4 were not being used on the vessel; and (b) that the flushing pump was being used as the sole supply.
2. Failure to adequately train the officers and crew on the vessel.
3. Failure to implement proper blackout procedures, checklists and drills on the vessel.
4. Failure to perform a risk assessment concerning the use of the flushing pump as the sole method of supplying fuel to (generators) 3 and 4.
5. Failure to notify Class that the vessel was sailing in protected waters using the flushing pump as the sole method of supplying fuel to (generators) 3 and 4.
6. Failure to notify Flag State that the vessel was sailing in protected waters using the flushing pump as the sole method of supplying fuel to (generators) 3 and 4.
7. Failure to investigate, document, and report two blackouts that occurred on the vessel on or about 25 March 2024.
8. Failure to comply with the vessel's safety management system following the dual blackout on 25 March 2024.
9. Failure to conduct an adequate Master/Pilot Exchange, including concealing and failing to inform the pilots of the fact that the non-redundant flushing pump was being used as the sole fuel supply source for (generators) 3 and 4.
10. Failure to conduct an adequate Master/Pilot Exchange, including concealing and failing to inform the pilots of the fact that a dual blackout had occurred on 25 March 2024.

Why were the crew using the flushing pump and not the "as designed" fuel system with the built-in redundancies?

It is a good question. The NTSB report has this to say:

- *According to the chief engineer and previous chief engineer, for at least 7 months leading up to the accident, the crew exclusively used the flushing pump to supply fuel to generator 3 and generator 4. The crew believed that the DG supply and booster pumps and the associated piping contained other fuel (VLSFO or HFO) that was not compliant with emissions regulations in certain geographic areas, and that the pumps and piping may have contained bacterial growth that could have contaminated the entire fuel system (a common occurrence with stagnant marine fuels). The crew explained that cleaning the system to use the supply and booster pumps would have taken several days, so they and the previous chief engineer chose to keep the DG fuel supply system configured to run DG3 and DG4 solely with the flushing pump.*

You mentioned breach of the SMS, are there any examples?

Yes. The obvious one is the failure to investigate the first blackout alongside, though this is arguably a little harsh given the casualty occurred the following day.

The SMS also stated:

- No modification shall be permitted to original equipment or machinery involved in the safety and performance output of the vessel unless it is approved by the flag state/classification society or original manufacturers.
- …under no circumstances (are) operational safety systems (to be) bypassed or ignored…

There was also a requirement for fuel oil pumps on standby to be kept in automatic mode and to be tested by tripping the running pump, something that plainly could not be done with the flushing pump.

There are other examples contained within the indictment along with an allegation that reference had been removed to the flushing pump by name in an inspection report.

What should Litigation Risk Management Newsletter readers take away from this?

I think much of the learning is self-evident, but there are two key takeaways for those individuals onboard ship and those tasked with advising them.

The first is that lying to a federal official during an investigation can be a felony. Showing a federal official a document that is false and attesting to its accuracy can be a felony. Many prosecutions of overboard discharges in contravention of MAROL are based on false testimony (the Chief Engineer asserting the Oil Record Book which doesn't mention the discharge, is a true record) rather than the actual discharge itself.

However, it is not only Oil Record Books, but it could also be as little as an USCG officer asking you if the hours of rest record you have signed is a true record. If you say "yes" and it is not a true record, then you could find yourself indicted.

As noted above, the penalty is up to five years in prison. If someone else was to incite you to falsify a record and then lie about it to a federal official, this could carry a penalty for them of up to 20 years in prison. It may not matter if that person was in another jurisdiction, the witness tampering statute explicitly overrides the normal geographic boundaries of US law, so a superintendent or manager in Europe say, may find him/herself indicted in the US if s/he was unwise enough to encourage a crewmember to misrepresent facts to a federal official in the US. (Of course that would require extradition).

In my experience crew may be less than honest with investigators out of a sense of loyalty to the company and those in the office or senior to them. My advice? Don't do it. As a junior lawyer, I was once instructed by my supervising partner to instruct crew to say when questioned that they couldn't remember. Thankfully, thinking this didn't seem right, I took the advice of our local attorney. A potential 20-year sentence concentrates the mind.

The second issue arises in the context of the "Misconduct or neglect of ship officers resulting in death," indictment, where one of the grounds is a failure to comply with the vessel's Safety Management System following the dual blackout on 25 March 2024. (This ground appears in a number of other indictments.) Given the incident was only the following day, that doesn't give ship's staff a lot of time.

Of course, given we don't know whether if (a) the correct fuel pumps were in use, (b) the breaker re-setting had been on automatic and (c) the override button had been activated to keep the main engine operating, or any combination of these three together or on their own, contact with the bridge would have been avoided.

Perhaps contact with the bridge was inevitable from the moment that loose wire initiated the tripping of the breaker and the LV blackout, in which case the deaths of the bridge workers cannot be attributed to the defendants. No doubt the defence will be looking at conducting simulations to address this point.

On reading the indictment though, and leaving to one side the six charges relating to the deaths of the workers and a few others, it seems to me that the indictment is crafted in such a way, that the prosecution doesn't need to prove the acts as alleged resulted in the contact with the bridge, the allegations are in respect of the acts themselves, rather than the consequence of those acts. I suspect that a deep dive into many vessels would reveal conditions which it could be argued with the benefit of hindsight should have, for example, been reported in the Master/Pilot exchange which is one of the allegations of wrong doing. I'd defy anyone who has served at sea, or worked in ship management, not to have a sinking feeling in the pit of their stomach when reading these indictments and thinking about their own professional experience.

Anything else?

Addressing risk management generally, owners and managers would be well advised to ask how thoroughly conversant their Masters and deck officers are of the shutdown, slow down and override protocols are when the main engine is on bridge control, and the procedure for restarting the main engine following a blackout when there is insufficient time to discuss this with the engine control room. I am surprised this wasn't addressed more fully in the NTSB report. In my mind it questions the utility of operating the main engine on bridge control.

Lastly, in fairness, the Company should have its own say. This is contained in a press release that it issued dated 13 May 2026 which I will leave as the last word in this article:

> *We are surprised and disappointed by the announcement that the U.S. Department of Justice is pursuing criminal charges against Synergy.*
>
> *DOJ is criminalising a tragic accident. The allegations in the indictment are baseless and have nothing to do with the DALI's allision with the Francis Scott Key Bridge. The DOJ's reference to the vessel's use of the flushing pump is wholly irrelevant to the cause of the allision and runs contrary to the conclusions reached by the U.S. National Transportation Safety Board following a comprehensive 20-month maritime accident investigation.*
>
> *This was a maritime casualty that should be assessed through the full factual, technical and regulatory record, rather than through selective mischaracterisations in a criminal indictment.*
>
> *The DALI experienced a power loss due to a manufacturer's latent defect: a loose wire in the ship's electrical system. When that occurred, the vessel was approximately three ship lengths away from the Francis Scott Key Bridge, transiting at approximately 8.5 knots. Both the NTSB and well-respected maritime experts have conclusively determined that the accident was inevitable due to the loose wire, which was in no way attributable to Synergy's operation of the vessel.*
>
> *The NTSB factual reports do not indicate that the probable cause of the allision was because the DALI was out of compliance with any code, law, regulation or rule governing her operation, or with the builder's recommendations, at the time of the allision. The DALI, and other vessels managed by Synergy, also had a near-flawless Port State Control record in the United States.*
>
> *DOJ's allegations are inconsistent with the clear and well-documented findings of the specialist maritime professionals involved in the NTSB investigation.*
>
> *Synergy will vigorously defend itself against these inaccurate allegations. Synergy and its employees have fully cooperated and have been transparent at all times during the NTSB's investigation, and any allegations to the contrary are woefully inaccurate.*
>
> *We are confident that the DOJ cannot and will not meet its burden of proof and that we will prevail at trial.*

CHINA TO LAUNCH COASTAL SHIP ROUTEING SYSTEM IN LIAONING

From 15 August 2026, Liaoning Province will introduce China's first province-wide coastal ship routeing system, covering key waterways in the Yellow and Bohai Seas. The new network aims to improve navigation safety, reduce collision risks, and enhance traffic flow.

Ship operators and voyage planners should review the new routeing requirements and update passage plans before the system takes effect.

IMO EVACUATION PLAN FOR 11K SEAFARERS



WATCH VIDEO NOW

Click the link on the image or scan the QR code to watch the video.

IMO Temporarily Pauses Strait of Hormuz Evacuation Operations

Following a recent attack on a vessel in the Gulf of Oman, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) has temporarily suspended its evacuation
(plan :
Designated waiting area
Temporary outbound route co-ordinates
Communication Channel
Procedure to follow)

IMO Secretary-General Mr.Arsenio Dominguez emphasized that the safety of seafarers remains the highest priority. While several vessels have already been successfully evacuated, the operation has been paused to reassess security conditions and ensure safe navigation for all vessels in the region.

The attacked vessel was not operating under the IMO evacuation framework, but the incident has highlighted the increasing security risks facing international shipping in this strategically important waterway.

Iran has declared the Strait of Hormuz closed, citing alleged breaches of a regional agreement. While US CENTCOM says the waterway remains open and no military enforcement has been reported, some shipping companies have already delayed or altered vessel transits.

The situation is being closely monitored as uncertainty continues to impact one of the world's most critical routes for oil, LNG, and global shipping.

Iran now requires all vessels transiting the Strait of Hormuz to carry insurance approved by its newly established Persian Gulf Strait Authority (PGSA), with free coverage offered for the first 60 days. Ships must also use Iran's designated northern route near Larak Island. The move has raised concerns among the maritime industry over potential future fees and restrictions, as discussions continue on the future of transit through this vital global shipping route.

JAPANESE RO-RO VESSEL NIRAIKANAI II GROUNDS OFF TOSHIMA ISLAND

Click the link on the image or scan the QR code to watch the video.



The Ukrainian Navy reported that last night Russia attacked two civilian merchant vessels heading to Ukrainian ports.

A 58-year-old cook, an Egyptian citizen, was killed on a Panama-flagged vessel. The other 8 crew members, including citizens of Turkey and India, were forced to evacuate on a life raft.

The vessel VICTRESS sustained significant damage and became unseaworthy.

Click the link on the image or scan the QR code to watch the video.

WINNING THE SALARY NEGOTIATION... BUT LOSING THE SUPERINTENDENT

During an interview for a Superintendent office position…

HR: "What are your salary expectations?"

Candidate: "USD 90,000 per year."

HR: "You're the ideal candidate for our Superintendent role, but that's beyond our budget."

Candidate: "I'm keen to join and need the opportunity. I can consider USD 82,000."

HR: "Great. If you can accept USD 78,000, we have a deal."

Candidate (hesitantly): "Alright. I accept."

Interview ends.

Later…

HR to Senior Management: "Good news! We've hired an experienced Superintendent. The approved budget for the position was USD 95,000, but I secured the candidate for USD 78,000. We've saved USD 17,000."

Senior Management: "Excellent work! That's a great cost saving."

HR believes the salary negotiation was a success, and management is pleased with the reduced hiring cost.

The new Superintendent joins the office, takes on responsibility for fleet operations, vessel support, audits, inspections, and crew management. Over time, they become aware of the market salary for similar Superintendent roles—and that the company had budgeted significantly more for the position.

What happens next?

- Dissatisfaction.
- Reduced motivation.
- Loss of trust.
- Increased likelihood of accepting another offer.

A few months later, the Superintendent resigns for a better opportunity.
The recruitment process begins again.
The company spends more time and money recruiting, onboarding, and training a replacement—while the remaining team carries the additional workload and operational continuity is disrupted.

Negotiating a fair salary is part of every hiring process. However, measuring success solely by how much was negotiated away can become an expensive mistake.
For Superintendent positions, where experience, decision-making, and continuity directly influence vessel performance and safety, retaining the right person is often far more valuable than the short-term savings achieved during salary negotiations.

HOW TO IDENTIFY THE SANCTIONED/SHADOW VESSEL

How to identify if a vessel or it's owner / operator are under any of the worlds sanctioned list:

Following available FREE and open for public viewing websites

U.S. Treasury (OFAC) database:

Check ships against the Specially Designated Nationals (SDN) List using the OFAC Sanctions List Search tool.

[https://sanctionssearch.ofac.treas.gov]

United Nations (UN)

Search the UN 1718 Sanctions List for vessels restricted for violating Security Council resolutions.

[https://main.un.org/securitycouncil/en/sanctions/1718/materials/1718-Designated-Vessels-List]

European Union (EU)

Verify vessel and operators subject to EU sanction list.

[https://www.sanctionsmap.eu/#/main; https://www.dma.dk/growth-and-framework-conditions/maritime-sanctions/sanctions-against-russia-and-belarus/eu-vessel-designations]

United Kingdom

Verify vessels and operators subject to asset freezes on the UK Sanctions List.

[https://search-uk-sanctions-list.service.gov.uk]

Capt Pant's Wife (Picture recreated for reference) posted as follows:

My husband, Captain Ajay Pant (who was arrested by UK for sanction vessel MT Smyrtos), is entirely innocent. He is a dedicated maritime professional with over 15 years of clean service, and he was simply doing his job as a merchant navy captain. This sudden crisis has come as a complete shock to our entire family, leaving us in a state of immense emotional distress and stress. Seeing him caught up in global corporate and political complexities is devastating. But we will not stay quiet. My family and I will fight till our very last breath and use every legal channel possible to bring him back home safely. We desperately need your prayers, support, and voices to ensure he gets a fair, transparent hearing. Please share this poster and stand with us.

I as a pleading wife request the whole country of INDIA to please stand with us, my 2 distress children and his elderly parents just praying to get him back home. I just need your support and prayers. Keep supporting us please.



WEEKLY MARITIME SAFETY BREACHES

These clips highlight unsafe acts, near misses, and onboard safety violations from across the maritime industry — reminding us why safety procedures must never be ignored.

Click the link on the image or scan the QR code to watch the Weekly Maritime Safety Breaches video.

MARITIME POLL RESULT

AUTONOMOUS SHIPPING BY 2040: WILL OFFICER JOBS DECLINE ?- POLL RESULTS

While 41% believe autonomous shipping will significantly reduce officer jobs by 2040, the majority (59%) expect human officers to remain essential or foresee only limited impact. The results reflect cautious optimism about the future role of seafarers.



DREAMING OF A CAREER AT SEA? THIS IS FOR YOU!

Click the link on the image or scan the QR code to watch video.

FREE DEMO CLASS REGISTRATION OPEN
click the icon below, to register today.



Study Smarter. Sail Further.

Confused with Celestial Navigation, Stability, Cargo Work, ROR, or MMD Exams?
You're not alone.

Mariners Update is launching Second Mate & Deck Cadet Online Tuition Classes designed to make maritime concepts simple, practical, and easy to understand.

Who can join?

Deck Cadets
Nautical Science Graduates
Second Mates
MMD Exam Candidates
Ratings aspiring to become Deck Officers

What you'll get:

Animated Lessons
Practical Shipboard Examples
Simplified Notes
Exam-Oriented Training
Doubt-Clearing Sessions
Guidance from Experienced Mariners

Join our Second Mate & Deck Cadet Online Tuition Classes.

Study smarter. Achieve your officer dream.

WEEKLY PILOT LADDER COMPLIANCES



Credits : Capt.Aries, fb page:Dangerous ladder

MARINER'S UPDATE

SHIP KNOWLEDGE SIMPLIFIED - DAY 4

Content not created by AI

LINES AND OFFSETS (LINES PLAN)

A ship's shape is complex. To understand and represent it on paper, we use a system of lines and offsets. This system helps us design, analyse and build the ship.

WHAT ARE LINES?

- The shape of a ship varies in height, length and breadth.
- To represent this 3D shape on paper, we use three sets of parallel planes mutually perpendicular to each other.
- The intersections of the hull with these planes produce lines that describe the shape.

WHAT ARE OFFSETS?

- Offsets are the perpendicular distances between the lines and a datum (reference line or plane).
- By measuring these distances, the exact shape of the hull can be obtained.

THREE MAIN SETS OF LINES

1. WATER LINES

Horizontal lines formed by horizontal planes. Shown on the plan where the ship meets the water.

Water lines

2. ORDINATES

Vertical lines taken at equal intervals from fore to aft. Used to divide the ship's length into equal sections (usually 20 parts).



Ordinates (Body Plan)

3. BUTTOCK LINES

Vertical lines taken at equal intervals from side to side. Parallel to the ship's centre plane. When drawn, they give the Sheer Plan.

Buttock lines (Sheer Plan)

4. DIAGONALS

- Diagonals are lines on the longitudinal plan that show the intersections of water lines with the buttock lines.
- They indicate the shape and curvature of the hull surfaces.
- The most commonly used diagonal is the Bilge Diagonal.



Bilge Diagonal

SUMMARY

- ✓ Water lines → show shape at different heights.
- ✓ Ordinates → divide length (fore and aft).
- ✓ Buttock lines → divide breadth (side to side).
- ✓ Diagonals → check the fairness and consistency of the hull shape.

MODERN APPLICATION

Today, computer programs use lines plan data to calculate many important aspects like displacement, stability, and volume. These calculations help in safe and efficient ship design.

★ Lines and offsets are the foundation of ship design. A clear lines plan leads to a well-designed, safe and seaworthy ship.

WEEKLY WEALTH PLAN FOR SAILORS

WEEK - 10

THE "HELPING EVERYONE" FINANCIAL MISTAKE

Helping without limits can destroy your financial future.

You work hard at sea. Make sure your hard-earned money builds YOUR future, not someone else's temporary comfort.



A YOUNG SEAFARER BECAME THE "GO-TO PERSON" FOR EVERYONE HE KNEW.

Every contract, someone needed financial help:

- Relatives facing emergencies
- Friends asking for loans
- Family businesses needing support

Believing he was doing the right thing, he kept saying "yes"—without written agreements, repayment plans, or financial limits.

After 8 Years

- Over $40,000 lent to others
- Very little money returned
- No meaningful savings or investments
- Relationships became strained when he asked for repayment

SMART TIPS FOR SEAFARERS

Decide in advance how much you can afford to lend.

If you lend money, document it clearly.

Build your emergency fund and investments before helping others financially.

Don't let guilt or pressure dictate financial decisions.

Sometimes the best help isn't money—it's guidance, advice, or support.

THE REAL LESSON

Generosity is a virtue. Boundaries protect your future.

HELPING WITHOUT LIMITS CAN DESTROY FINANCIAL GROWTH.


SHORE LEAVE
EXPECTATION
Time to enjoy my shore leave!
LUXURY HOTEL
REALITY
NOTICE
NO SHORE LEAVE UNTIL FURTHER NOTICE
NORMAL PERSON
It's raining. I'll stay home.
SEAFARER
I've seen worse.
Schedule unchanged. We sail.
THE WEATHER HAS CONCERNS.
THE VOYAGE DOESN'T.


NORMAL PEOPLE
"Ugh... time to go to office."
OFFICE
SEAFARERS
Office? I live here.
This is my second home."
MOST PEOPLE LEAVE HOME FOR WORK
SEAFARERS LEAVE HOME FOR THEIR 2ND HOME


PEOPLE PAY FOR THE RIDE OF THEIR LIVES.
SEAFARERS GET PAID TO LIVE IT.
SAME THRILL. DIFFERENT WORLD.

NEW PUBLICATION



MARINER'S UPDATE



The Telephone Nobody Uses Until It Matters

Observation:

During testing of emergency communications, the sound-powered telephone between the bridge and steering gear room was found unable to function.

Non Compliance	Regulatory Requirement
Sound-powered telephone between the bridge and steering gear room unable to function.	SOLAS Chapter V, Regulation 26.2.3 & Chapter II-1 Reg 29.10 – Steering Gear Requires reliable means of communication to be provided between the navigating bridge and the steering gear compartment whenever the steering gear compartment is not continuously manned.

At first glance, this may appear to be a minor equipment defect.

As an auditor, I see it differently.

The steering gear room is one of the most critical spaces onboard during a steering failure, loss of bridge control, or emergency steering operation. When normal communication systems fail, the crew's ability to communicate effectively between the bridge and steering gear room becomes essential for maintaining control of the vessel.

Many ships rely heavily on UHF radios, internal telephones, and other portable communication devices.

However, emergencies rarely occur under ideal conditions.

- Batteries fail.
- Power supplies are lost.
- Portable radios become unavailable.
- Background noise increases.

That is exactly why the sound-powered telephone exists.

Unlike conventional communication systems, a sound-powered telephone requires no external power source and remains available even during electrical failures.

A communication failure during a steering gear failure creates a second emergency.

A successful emergency steering drill is not achieved when the rudder moves.

Note: Picture intentionally blurred.

The Auditor's Diary

Real observations from ships, audits, inspections, and compliance reviews.

The observations presented in this section are based on actual conditions encountered during onboard audits, inspections, compliance reviews, and PSC readiness assessments.

Many deficiencies are not hidden. They exist in plain sight. Over time, crews and managers may become accustomed to them, while their compliance, safety, and operational implications remain unnoticed.

Each note highlights a practical observation, the applicable regulatory considerations, and the lessons that can be learned from everyday situations onboard.

The purpose is not merely to identify deficiencies, but to encourage awareness, critical thinking, and continual improvement throughout the maritime industry.

SHORE JOBS


ATLANTAS GROUP
WE ARE HIRING!
BUILD YOUR CAREER WITH A GLOBAL LEADER
GLOBAL PRESENCE
SAFETY FIRST
PEOPLE FOCUSED
FOR NAVI MUMBAI LOCATION:
1 TECHNICAL – SENIOR TECHNICAL SUPERINTENDENT
Sailed as Chief Engineer on oil/chemical tankers with 4 to 5 years shore job experience in the same role.
2 TECHNICAL – TECHNICAL SUPERINTENDENT
Sailed as Chief Engineer in oil / chemical tankers & 1 to 2 years shore job experience in the same role.
3 CREWING – RECRUITMENT EXECUTIVE (TOP 4 RANKS)
FOR CHANDIGARH LOCATION:
1 ADMIN – ADMIN ASSISTANT
With good experience for at least 2 years.
2 CREWING – RECRUITMENT EXECUTIVE (FOR RATINGS)
3 CREWING – DOCUMENT ASSISTANT
1 to 2 years in ship management company.
SEND YOUR RESUME TO:
s.dewnani@ashipS.co.uk
SAILING TOGETHER TOWARDS EXCELLENCE
INTEGRITY • COMMITMENT • EXCELLENCE


SEA AND BEYOND
Connecting People, Transforming Lives
WE ARE HIRING!
SHORE BASED OPPORTUNITY
WE ARE LOOKING FOR
TECHNICAL SUPERINTENDENT
★ SHORE JOB ★
CHIEF ENGINEER – BULK CARRIER BACKGROUND
Chennai / Gurugram
CHIEF ENGINEER – BULK CARRIER BACKGROUND
Delhi
Minimum 1 year of shore-based experience required
CHIEF ENGINEER – OIL TANKER BACKGROUND
Navi Mumbai / Chennai / Gurugram
CHIEF ENGINEER – LPG VESSEL BACKGROUND
Mumbai
CHIEF ENGINEER – CONTAINER BACKGROUND
Mumbai
Minimum 1 year of shore-based experience (Preferred)
WHY JOIN SEA AND BEYOND?
PEOPLE FIRST
GROWTH & DEVELOPMENT
INTEGRITY & SAFETY
COLLABORATION & RESPECT
GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES
APPLY NOW!
TAKE THE NEXT STEP IN YOUR CAREER
jyothi@seaandbeyond.com
+91 85914 14317
CONNECTING PEOPLE. TRANSFORMING LIVES.
www.seaandbeyond.com


INDIAN REGISTER OF SHIPPING
A Statutory Body under Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India
IRCLASS
WE ARE HIRING!
JOIN IRCLASS ACADEMY
IRCLASS is looking for an experienced maritime professional to join IRCLASS Academy.
The role combines academic administration, curriculum development, and subject matter expertise to design and deliver high-quality training programs. The candidate will be responsible for supporting value-added training initiatives.
QUALIFICATIONS & EXPERIENCE:
Master Mariner, prior exposure to training, curriculum design, or academic administration will be an added advantage.
KEY RESPONSIBILITIES:
TRAINING DELIVERY:
Conduct classroom and/or online training sessions for maritime professionals across relevant
CURRICULUM DEVELOPMENT:
Design, update, and enhance training modules, ensuring alignment industry standards, regulatory requirements.
Oversee training schedules, coordinate with trainers, and support the overall administration of the academy.
PROGRAM DEVELOPMENT:
Conceptualize and deliver value-added programs for the maritime industry.
INDUSTRY ENGAGEMENT:
Stay updated with maritime sector trends to bring innovative practices and insights into training.
QUALITY ASSURANCE:
Ensure training delivery meets IRCLASS standards and accreditation requirements.
INTERESTED CANDIDATES
KINDLY SHARE YOUR RESUMES WITH ME AT
apurva.shah@irclass.org
KINDLY MENTION
IRCLASS ACADEMY
IN THE SUBJECT.
BE PART OF A TRUSTED LEGACY
SHAPE THE FUTURE OF MARITIME TRAINING
MAKE AN IMPACT GLOBALLY
SAIL TOWARDS EXCELLENCE


MMSI
SAFE SEAS • STRONGER FUTURES
WE ARE
HIRING!
JOIN OUR TEAM
1. FOR OIL / CHEMICAL TANKER
ETO (With COC)
6 – 12 MONTHS RANK EXPERIENCE ON SIMILAR SHIP TYPE
WHITE COC ONLY
AGE BELOW 40 YEARS
CONTACT
harshali.kadam@meiji-group.com
+91 8591090766
Harshali Kadam
MMSI
SAFETY • RELIABILITY • INTEGRITY • EXCELLENCE
SAILING TOWARDS A BETTER TOMORROW


KIWA
KIWA SHIPPING LLP
WE ARE
HIRING!
JOIN OUR TEAM
FOR
MR TANKER
Fleet
3RD OFFICER
CHIEF ENGINEER
2ND ENGINEER
3RD ENGINEER
4TH ENGINEER
MINIMUM 12 MONTHS' EXPERIENCE IN THE SAME RANK
FOR MR TANKER FLEET
WHITE COC ONLY
IMMEDIATE JOINING
CONTACT US
+91 8544883611
+91 7347291211
recruitment@kiwashipping.com
KIWA SHIPPING LLP
• RPSL No. : MUM 162260 •


oceanonesm
Propelling Your Future
URGENT
OPENING
We have an URGENT opening for the following ranks on
MPV / GENERAL CARGO
THIRD OFFICER
Rank Experience On MPV / GENERAL CARGO is Mandatory
Foreign Going Vessels
High-Speed Internet Onboard
Timely Relief
Online Joining Process – No office visit required
Immediate Joining
US VISA MANDATORY
If you are available and interested, kindly share your latest resume.
Also, please refer suitable candidates for the same.
IMMEDIATE JOINING
BEST REGARDS,
ANKIT
SOURCING EXECUTIVE
OCEAN ONE SHIP MANAGEMENT
ankit@oceanoneshipmanagemet.com
+91 9115909113
SAFETY FIRST
INTEGRITY
TEAMWORK
EXCELLENCE


WALLEM
GREETINGS FROM
WALLEM SHIP MANAGEMENT
TOP URGENT
REQUIREMENTS
WE HAVE THE FOLLOWING IMMEDIATE OPENINGS:
1
CO – WITH VALID US VISA
Vessel Type: Oil/ Chem
Joining: ASAP
Minimum – 12 m Exp in rank Required.
Thanks and Regards
RAMA CHAUDHARY
Wallem Shipmanagement
Mobile No :
m: +91 9007078121
Email :
rch@wallem.com
SAFETY • RELIABILITY • EXCELLENCE

NAZ MARITIME

RPSL/MUM/130

Your Partner at Sea

GREETINGS FROM

NAZ MARITIME

www.nazmaritime.com

Naz Maritime is currently recruiting for the following vessels:

BULK CARRIER	• Chief Engineer (CE) • Second Engineer (2E) • Third Engineer (3E) • Electro-Technical Officer (ETO)
CONTAINER VESSEL	• Chief Engineer (CE) • Third Engineer (3E) • Fourth Engineer (4E) • Electro-Technical Officer (ETO)
RO-RO / CONTAINER VESSEL	• Chief Engineer (CE) • Second Engineer (2E) • Electro-Technical Officer (ETO)
PCTC	• Second Engineer (2E) • Third Engineer (3E) • Electro-Technical Officer (ETO)
GENERAL CARGO / HEAVY LIFT	• Second Engineer (2E)

JOINING: IMMEDIATE / JUNE 2026 | APPLY NOW!

CANDIDATES MUST POSSESS:

- VALID STCW CERTIFICATES
- VALID PASSPORT & SEAMAN BOOK
- RELEVANT RANK EXPERIENCE ON SIMILAR VESSEL TYPES

CONTACT:

Aaditi Sharma
Recruitment Executive

Call / WhatsApp
+91 74000 95116

Email
aaditisharma265@gmail.com

Fair Winds & Following Seas!

Nimbus

NIMBUS MARINE SERVICES PTE LTD

URGENT OPENING

JOINING ASAP!

- VESSEL TYPE: AHTS DP 2
- LOCATION: MALAYSIA
- NATIONALITY: INDIAN
- DURATION: 12 WEEKS
- JOINING: ASAP

OPEN POSITIONS

CHIEF OFFICER SDPO

SECOND ENGINEER

- MUST HAVE 2 YEARS RANK EXPERIENCE ON SAME TYPE OF VESSEL
- MUST HOLD ALL VALID DOCUMENTS

INTERESTED CANDIDATES CAN SEND CV ON

+91 73043 18410 | crew@nimbusmarinegroup.com

COLUMBIA AURUS
SHIP MANAGEMENT

WE ARE HIRING!

JOIN OUR TEAM

COLUMBIA AURUS SHIP MANAGEMENT (RPSL-MUM-373)

01 ETO COC III/6 – FPSO

- MINIMUM 2 YEARS RANK EXPERIENCE
- WITH (FPSO, VLCC) SIMILAR TYPE OF VESSEL
- JOINING MID JULY IN SINGAPORE

02 ETO COC III/6 – AHTS DP 1

- MINIMUM 1 YEARS RANK EXPERIENCE WITH SIMILAR TYPE OF VESSEL
- (DIESEL ELECTRIC EXPERIENCE MUST)
- CONTRACT 60 DAYS JOINING ASAP IN GUYANA

REPUTED COMPANY | GROW YOUR CAREER | SAFETY FIRST | GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES

SEND YOUR CV TO

priyanka@columbiaaurus.com | +91 8104721414

SAILING TOGETHER, SUCCEEDING TOGETHER

BELLFRANC
SHIP MANAGEMENT

WE ARE

HIRING!

JOIN OUR TEAM

FOR

CONTAINER VESSEL

3× AB-OILER WITH COP

3 CONTRACT RANK EXPERIENCE MUST ON CONTAINER

GROW WITH A GLOBAL LEADER | EXCELLENT WORK ENVIRONMENT | SAFETY FIRST | RELIABLE. RESPONSIBLE. RESPECTED.

CONTACT US

+91 99204 66340 | ops@bellfranc.com

Bellfranc Ship Management

CASCADE MARITIME

!!! TOP URGENT HIRING !!!

GREETINGS FROM
CASCADE MARITIME PVT LTD

WE REQUIRE FOLLOWING RANKS

FOR
PANAMAX BULK CARRIER VESSEL

3RD ENGINEER	USD 3500 - 4000/-
4TH ENGINEER	USD 2500 - 3200/-

IND / UK / SINGAPORE COC ACCEPTABLE

NOTE: RANK EXPERIENCE MUST FOR ABOVE REQUIREMENTS !

INTERESTED CANDIDATE CAN SEND CV AT

info@cascadesm.com

WHATSAPP +91 6239047197

INTERNATIONAL
ANDROMEDA SHIPPING

WE ARE HIRING FOR
VLCC DUAL FUEL TANKER

VESSEL TYPE VLCC DUAL FUEL TANKER | USA VISA MUST | DUAL FUEL SHIP SAILING EXPERIENCE MUST | WHITE COC ONLY

OPEN POSITIONS

2ND ENGINEER	18 - 36 MONTHS RANK EXPERIENCE	DUAL FUEL SHIP SAILING EXPERIENCE MUST
3RD ENGINEER	12 - 18 MONTHS RANK EXPERIENCE	DUAL FUEL SHIP SAILING EXPERIENCE MUST
4TH ENGINEER	6 - 12 MONTHS RANK EXPERIENCE	DUAL FUEL SHIP SAILING EXPERIENCE MUST

WHITE COC ONLY | EXCELLENT WORKING ENVIRONMENT | COMPETITIVE WAGES BEST IN MARKET

SHARE YOUR RESUME ON
sourcing@andromeda-india.com

USA VISA COMPULSORY

SEAVIEW

GREETINGS FROM,
SEAVIEW SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD
RPSL - MUM-162245

WE REQUIRE
CREW
FOR OUR VESSEL

- VESSEL : TANKER
- GRT : 20000T
- OILER : 65000-70000 INR
- IND WK MUST
- MUST HAVE RANK EXPERIENCE

INTERESTED CANDIDATES CAN DROP THERE CV HERE

CONTACT : 7208695742

MAIL : seaviewcrew7@gmail.com

WE ARE HIRING!

SYNERGY GROUP

JOIN OUR TEAM
SAIL TOWARDS A BETTER FUTURE WITH SYNERGY GROUP

4RTH ENGINEER
With
12 MONTH RANK EXPERIENCE

For
OIL CHEM TANKER & BULK CARRIER

WHITE COC ONLY

CONTACT US
+91 95824 95894
gaurav.t@synerymanning.com
Synergy Maritime

Blackhull

MARITIME SERVICES PRIVATE LIMITED

AWAKEN YOUR SPIRIT

WE ARE HIRING!

Join a trusted name in maritime excellence and build your career with us.

POSITIONS

- 2ND OFFICER
- 3RD OFFICER

FOR

OIL PRODUCT TANKER

RANK EXPERIENCE ON SIMILAR SHIP TYPE MANDATORY

WHITE COC ONLY

SEND YOUR CV & DOCUMENTS

+91 93262 59851

info@blackhullmaritime.com

SAFETY
EXCELLENCE
RELIABILITY

SAILING TOGETHER TOWARDS A BETTER TOMORROW

NORBULK

CREWING SERVICES INDIA PVT LTD (NOIDA)

RPSL: MUM-162249

WE ARE HIRING!

JOINING 27 JUNE (MALTA)

FOR

TAKEOVER

CONTAINER VESSEL

2008 BUILT

AB × 2

WITH COP

MUST HAVE EXPERIENCE ON CONTAINER VESSELS IS MANDATORY.

crewing.india@norbulkshipping.com

+91 96679 30737

SAILING TOGETHER TOWARDS EXCELLENCE

WORLDTANKERS

CREWING INDIA PVT LTD !!

(RPSL MUM 238)

WE ARE HIRING

Join Our Team

FOR OUR OIL CHEM & CHEMICAL TANKER FLEET

POSITIONS REQUIRED

MASTER	
CHIEF OFFICER	WITH 36 MONTHS EXPERIENCE
ETO	
PUMPMAN	WITH COP
OILER	WITH COP

WHITE COC ONLY | USA VISA MUST | OIL CHEM DC REQUIRED | RANK EXPERIENCE MUST ON SHIP TYPE

info@wtmindia.com

7506014307 // 9967503445 // 7506129672 // 9819187119 // 9833736985

SAILING TOGETHER TOWARDS EXCELLENCE

Eastaway

EASTAWAY INDIA PVT LTD.

Greeting

TO ALL SEAFARERS FROM EASTAWAY INDIA PVT LTD.

FOR CONTAINER

OFFICER RANKS

- MASTER (MST)
- CHIEF OFFICER (COFF)
- 2ND OFFICER
- 3RD OFFICER

CONTAINER EXPERIENCE COMPULSORY

ENGINEER RANKS

- 2ND ENGINEER
- 4TH ENGINEER
- 3RD ENGINEER

CONTAINER / BULK EXPERIENCE REQUIRED

EXPERIENCE: MINIMUM 6 MONTHS IN SAME RANK MANDATORY

WHITE COC ONLY

FOR CONTAINER VESSEL

INTERESTED CANDIDATES MAY CONTACT

(+91) 7738375635

komal.vinerkar@eastaway.com

SAILING TOGETHER ★ GROWING TOGETHER ★ SUCCEEDING TOGETHER

COLUMBIA AURUS
SHIP MANAGEMENT

COLUMBIA AURUS SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD.

RPSL NO: MUM-373

WE ARE HIRING!



FOR FPSO TANKER

ETO

ETO WITH **COC**

\+

12 MONTHS RANK EXPERIENCE
REQUIRED IN SAME TYPE OF VESSEL.

- ATTRACTIVE SALARY
- SAFE & SECURE ENVIRONMENT
- TIMELY RELIEF
- GROW YOUR CAREER WITH US

CONTACT US
8976507514

EMAIL US
pratiksha@columbiaaurus.com

---

oceanonesm
Propelling Your Future

RPSL-MUM-162021
DOI 09-Aug-2024
DOE 09-Aug-2029

GREETINGS FROM
OCEAN ONE SHIP MANAGEMENT

WE HAVE AN
URGENT
OPENING FOR

ABLE SEAMAN
ON 5182 GRT
OIL PRODUCT TANKER

- RANK EXPERIENCE ON OIL TANKER IS MANDATORY
- COP IS MUST
- HIGH-SPEED INTERNET ONBOARD
- MIXED CREW
- TIMELY RELIEF
- ONLINE JOINING PROCESS – NO OFFICE VISIT REQUIRED
- IMMEDIATE JOINING
- VESSEL SAILING IN NON WAR ZONE AREA

If you are available and interested, kindly share your latest resume. Also, please refer suitable candidates for the same.

Best Regards,
Harpreet
Jr. Sourcing Executive

harpreet@oceanoneshipmanagemet.com
+91 9115909195

HARBOREX
SHIPPING & MARINE SERVICES LLP

RPSL-MUM-162359

URGENT REQUIREMENT
– VLCC –

GREETINGS FROM
HARBOREX SHIPPING & MARINE SERVICES LLP.

We are urgently looking for experienced and competent officers for our VLCC Vessel.

POSITIONS REQUIRED:

CH OFF	2/O	2/E	3/E	4/E

REQUIREMENTS:

- Valid White COC mandatory
- Relevant rank experience on MR Tankers preferred
- All STCW certificates valid
- Good track record and professional attitude
- Immediate joiners preferred

VESSEL DETAILS:

VESSEL TYPE:
VLCC

INTERESTED CANDIDATES:

Please share your updated CV along with COC, CDC, Passport, and other valid certificates.

CONTACT:
+91 8708844242
+91 9669670877
+91 9167921718

EMAIL:
info@harborexshipping.in

SAILING TOGETHER, DELIVERING EXCELLENCE

UNAONE

UNAONE SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT.LTD.

RPSL Number: MUM-162038
(Valid Till: 10/02/2030)

URGENT OPENING ON
VLCC
(CRUDE TANKER)

1	CHIEF OFFICER	
2	CHIEF ENGINEER	
3	2ND ENGINEER	
4	3RD ENGINEER	
5	ELECTRICAL OFFICER	

- WHITE COC Mandatory
- ATTRACTIVE SALARY As per rank & experience
- TIMELY RELIEF As per company policy
- SAFE & PROFESSIONAL Work Environment
- IMMEDIATE Joiners Preferred

URGENT OPENING ON
SUEZMAX TANKER
(CRUDE TANKER)

1	CHIEF ENGINEER	
2	2ND ENGINEER	

CONTACT US

Mobile:
9167731072

Email:
hr3@unaoneship.com

SAILING TOGETHER, GROWING TOGETHER


OSM Thome
QUALITY | SAFETY | INTEGRITY
WE ARE HIRING!
BOSUN
WITH COP
FOR
CHEMICAL TANKER
HARD CHEMICAL
EXPERIENCE MUST IN RANK
INTERESTED CANDIDATES CAN CONTACT
86570 08637
dipti.deorukhkar@osmthome.com
OSM THOME
SAILING TOGETHER TOWARDS A BETTER TOMORROW


GREETINGS FROM
SEAVIEW
SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD
SEAVIEW
SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD
RPSL - MUM-162245
WE REQUIRE CREW
FOR OUR VESSEL
VESSEL :
TANKER
GRT :
7000T
RANK :
2ND ENGINEER
3RD ENGINEER
CH OFFICER
WHITE COC ONLY
SALARY AS PER EXPERIENCE
MUST HAVE RANK EXPERIENCE
INTERESTED CANDIDATES CAN DROP THERE CV HERE
CONTACT :
7977957212
MAIL :
seaviewcrew7@gmail.com


NAUTILUS
SHIPPING
Nautilus Shipping India Pvt. Ltd.
RPSL No.: CHN 012
FOR CONTAINER VESSEL
FLAG: INDIA
WE ARE HIRING!
Join our team and sail towards a better future together.
POSITIONS
MASTER
CHIEF OFFICER
With
Rank experience must on container
CHIEF ENGINEER
2ND ENGINEER
3RD ENGINEER
4RTH ENGINEER
With
Rank experience must – container experience preferred
REQUIREMENTS
Rank experience must on container
Valid Indian Certificate of Competency (CoC) only
Indian CoC only
Good communication skills, team player and professional attitude
Immediate joiners will be preferred
SAFE WORK ENVIRONMENT
GROW YOUR CAREER
MODERN FLEET & GLOBAL OPERATIONS
EXCELLENT SALARY & BENEFITS
RESPECT & FAIRNESS
INTERESTED CANDIDATES MAY SHARE THEIR CVs to check suitability.
+91 7397588636 | +91 7305443528
crewing.fg@nautilusshipping.com


IMS
IMS SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT. LTD.
(RPSL: MUM-023)
URGENT REQUIREMENT
THIRD OFFICERs REQUIRED FOR VLCC
Minimum 6 months of Rank experience required on VLCC
SAIL ON MODERN FLEET
SAFE & SECURE OPERATIONS
GROW YOUR CAREER WITH US
GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES
INTERESTED INDIAN CANDIDATES
may share their CVs via WhatsApp to +91 9967659701
or email at vivek.bawkar@imsship.com to check suitability.
IMS Ship Management Pvt. Ltd. (RPSL: MUM-023)
www.imsship.com

HARBOREX
SHIPPING & MARINE SERVICES LLP

SAFE SHIPPING
OUR COMMITMENT
YOUR TRUST

RPSL-MUM-162359

URGENT REQUIREMENT
★ TANKER ★

Greetings from HARBOREX SHIPPING & MARINE SERVICES LLP.

We are urgently looking for experienced and competent officers for our 10000 GRT Tanker Vessel.

POSITION REQUIRED

CH ENGG

VESSEL DETAILS

Vessel Type:
MR TANKER

10000 GRT
TANKER VESSEL

REQUIREMENTS:

- Valid White COC mandatory
- Relevant rank experience on MR Tankers preferred
- All STCW certificates valid
- Good track record and professional attitude
- Immediate joiners preferred

INTERESTED CANDIDATES:

Please share your updated CV along with COC, CDC, Passport, and other valid certificates.

CV | COC | CDC | PASSPORT | CERTIFICATES

CONTACT US

+91 87088 44242 | +91 96696 70877 | +91 91679 21718

info@harborexshipping.in

Only suitable amd experienced candidates will be considered.

SAFETY • QUALITY • RELIABILITY

High Tiide Ship

HIGH TIDE SHIP MANAGEMENT PRIVATE LIMITED
RPSL-MUM-074 | 25+ Years of Excellence

أرامكو السعودية
saudi aramco

SAUDI ARAMCO APPROVED MARINE PROJECT

URGENT HIRING

CREWBOAT / WORKBOAT OPERATIONS

OPEN POSITIONS — 2 ROLES — 40 TOTAL VACANCIES

20 X 2ND MATE

CREW BOAT

Vacancies	20 Positions
Vessel Type	Crew Boat
Day Rate	USD 150 / Day
CoC Required	Unlimited — MANDATORY
Note	Aramco approved Workboat / Utility Boat second mate are accepted

20 X 2ND ENGR

WORKBOAT / UTILITY BOAT

Vacancies	20 Positions
Vessel Type	Workboat / Utility Boat
Day Rate	USD 150 / Day
CoC Required	Unlimited — MANDATORY
Note	Aramco approved Workboat / Utility Boat second mate are accepted

⚠ UNLIMITED CoC IS MANDATORY

DOCUMENTS REQUIRED

CV | SEA SERVICE CERTIFICATE | APPRAISAL

SHARE NOW! SHARE CV, SEA SERVICE, APPRAISAL

jobs@hightideship.com | +91 97022 05876

EXCELLENT OPPORTUNITIES | COMPETITIVE DAY RATE | SAFE & RELIABLE OPERATIONS | GROW WITH A LEADING TEAM

UNAONE
SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT.LTD.

SAFE SHIPS · SAFE PEOPLE · SAFE SEAS

RPSL Number: MUM-162038
(Valid Till: 10/02/2030)

WE ARE HIRING!

Join our team and sail towards a better tomorrow.



SAFETY QUALITY RELIABILITY OUR PRIORITY

URGENT OPENING ON
VLCC (CRUDE TANKER)

1. CHIEF OFFICER
2. CHIEF ENGINEER
3. 2ND ENGINEER
4. 3RD ENGINEER
5. ELECTRICAL OFFICER

EXPERIENCED PROFESSIONALS WITH GOOD SEA SERVICE PREFERRED

URGENT OPENING ON
SUEZMAX TANKER (CRUDE TANKER)

1. CHIEF ENGINEER
2. 2ND ENGINEER

GROW YOUR CAREER | SAFE & SECURE WORK ENVIRONMENT | MODERN FLEET & TECHNOLOGY | PROFESSIONAL WORK CULTURE | GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES

CONTACT US

Mobile: 9167731072 | Email: hr3@unaoneship.com

APOLLO
APOLLO MARITIME

OIL CHEM TANKER

WE ARE HIRING!

Join a leading maritime company.
Sail with us. Grow with us.

OPEN POSITIONS

MASTER

Atleast 12 month rank experience must on ship type

CHIEF ENGINEER

Atleast 12 month rank experience must on ship type

WHITE COC ONLY

WHY JOIN APOLLO MARITIME?

MODERN FLEET
Work on well-maintained Oil Chem Tankers

GROW YOUR CAREER
Opportunities for professional growth and development

SAFETY FIRST
Committed to the highest standards of safety and environmental protection

GLOBAL OPPORTUNITIES
Be part of a global team with worldwide exposure

CONTACT US

+91 93263 82514 | suraj.johnson@apollomaritimegroup.com | Apollo maritime

SAFETY. RELIABILITY. EXCELLENCE. WE DELIVER.

NJORD

Maximum Fleet

WE ARE HIRING!

Join Our Crew. Sail with Purpose.

NJORD ships is looking for dedicated and experienced professionals to join our team onboard our **Container Vessels.**

OPEN POSITIONS

- **2E** with 12 months rank experience (3 months contract)
- **ETO** with COC

OWNERSHIP COMPANY — CMA CGM — CMA CGM OWNERS

WHY JOIN NJORD SHIPS?

- **Seafarers First** — Our mariners are our priority
- **Safe & Compliant Operations** — Highest standards of safety and compliance
- **Growth & Development** — Opportunities to grow your career with a global leader
- **Global Exposure** — Work on modern vessels with a world-class team

CONTACT US

+91 9029483950 | rajib@njordships.com | NJORD ships

Mariners First. Safety Always. Excellence Every Day.

ADMIRAL MARINE SERVICES

CREWING EXCELLENCE, NAVIGATING FUTURES

RPSL CHN/022

WE ARE HIRING!

JOIN OUR TEAM

1) **2E**

PASSENGER VESSEL

(FG COC)

Promotional candidate also accepted (should have 6 months experience AFTER obtaining CLASS II)

KOCHI - LAKSHADWEEP ISLANDS

cochin@admiralmarine.com

+91 91508 19555

SAFETY PROFESSIONALISM RELIABILITY

SAILING TOGETHER TOWARDS A BETTER TOMORROW

SEVEN ISLANDS

SEVEN ISLANDS SHIPPING LIMITED

WE ARE HIRING

ETO

FOR

FG TRADING

SUEZMAX TANKER

FOR **ME B OR C** TYPE ENGINE EXPERIENCE TOO

REQUIREMENTS

- INDIAN CoC AND CERTIFICATES ARE COMPULSORY.
- PAN CARD AADHAR CARD MUST BE LINKED.
- ONLY CANDIDATES WITH RELEVANT EXPERIENCE MAY APPLY.

9892097820 | dilippandit@sishipping.com

SEVEN ISLANDS

SAFE SEAS • RELIABLE PARTNERSHIP • EXCELLENCE ALWAYS

OLYMPUS

Ship Management Pvt. Ltd

25 JUNE 2026

GREETINGS FROM

OLYMPUS SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD

(RPSL MUM 162135)

FOR

BULK CARRIER

- CHIEF ENGINEER
- 2ND ENGINEER
- 3RD ENGINEER
- 4TH ENGINEER

COC ACCEPTED – INDIA, UK, SINGAPORE, AUSTRALIA, NEW ZEALAND

ABOVE SHOULD HAVE RANK EXPERIENCE OF AT LEAST 12–18 MONTHS ON BULK CARRIER.

+91-8291152290 | info@olympusship.com

COLUMBIA AURUS
SHIP MANAGEMENT
RPSL MUM 373

WE ARE HIRING EXPERIENCED SEAFARERS

FOR VLCC


- 3RD OFFICER (3O), 4TH ENGINEER (4E)
  - 12 MONTHS EXP ON VLCC
  - US VISA
- ETO WITH COC
  - MUST EXP ON RT FLEX ENGINE
  - US VISA

FOR BULK


- 4TH ENGINEER (4E), 3RD ENGINEER (3E), 3RD OFFICER (3O), 2ND OFFICER (2O)
- ETO WITH COC
- US VISA MUST

FOR CONTAINERS


- 3RD OFFICER (3O), 3RD ENGINEER (3E)
- ETO WITH COC
- 6–12 MONTH RANK EXPERIENCE

WHITE COC ONLY | US VISA REQUIRED (AS APPLICABLE) | ATTRACTIVE SALARY TIMELY RELIEF GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES

SEND YOUR CV TO
amba@columbiaaurus.com

FOR MORE INFORMATION
+91 8976507514

UNAONE
SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT. LTD.
RPSL Number: MUM-162038
(Valid Till: 10/02/2030)

URGENT OPENING
JOIN OUR GROWING FLEET

URGENT OPENING ON VLCC (CRUDE TANKER)


1. CHIEF OFFICER
2. CHIEF ENGINEER
3. 2ND ENGINEER
4. 3RD ENGINEER
5. ELECTRICAL OFFICER

URGENT OPENING ON SUEZMAX TANKER (CRUDE TANKER)


1. CHIEF ENGINEER
2. 2ND ENGINEER

COMPETITIVE SALARY | PROFESSIONAL ENVIRONMENT | GLOBAL EXPOSURE | WELFARE FOCUSED | GROW WITH US

INTERESTED CANDIDATES, PLEASE CONTACT
Mobile: 9167731072
Email: hr3@unaoneship.com

One Goal. One Team. One Voyage.

GREETINGS FROM,

SEAVIEW
SHIP MANAGEMENT PVT LTD
RPSL - MUM-162245

WE REQUIRE
– CREW FOR OUR VESSEL –

VESSEL DETAILS
- VESSEL : TANKER
- GRT : 7000

POSITIONS AVAILABLE

CH OFFICER	5000 - 5500 $
2ND ENGINEER	6000 - 6800 $
3RD ENGINEER	3000 - 3500 $

- WHITE COC
- MUST HAVE RANK EXPERIENCE
- SAFE SHIP SAFE CAREER

INTERESTED CANDIDATES CAN
DROP THEIR CV HERE

CONTACT US
7977563819 | seaviewcrew7@gmail.com

VR Maritime Services Private Limited
RPSL-MUM-199, MUMBAI

WE ARE HIRING!

3rd OFFICER
FOR
VLEC VESSEL
ETHYLENE CARRIER
(YEAR OF BUILT 2025)

RANK EXPERIENCE	WHITE COC	JOINING	IMMEDIATE JOINERS	SAFE CARRIERS
must on ship type	only	10th July 2026	PREFERRED	SAFE CAREERS

SEND YOUR CV TO
+91 86574 96814 | resume@vrmaritime.net

SAFETY | RELIABILITY | EXCELLENCE


NAZ MARITIME SERVICES PVT. LTD.
(MUM RPSL 130)
WE ARE HIRING!
BULK / CONTAINER VESSEL
2E
(WHITE COC)
Rank experience must on ship type
REQUIREMENTS:
Valid White COC Mandatory
Relevant Rank Experience on Bulk / Container Vessel
All STCW Certificates Valid
Good Track Record & Professional Attitude
Immediate Joiners Preferred
PLEASE DO NOT SEND CVS FOR:
TR.OS
OS
TME
Deck Cadet
Messman
WHATSAPP CVS TO:
+91 74000 95115
sourcing@nazmaritime.com
Sail with Excellence


PG
PG MARITIME PVT LTD
RPSL-MUM-372
WE ARE HIRING!
JOIN OUR GROWING FLEET
EXCITING CAREER OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXPERIENCED OFFICERS
AVAILABLE POSITIONS
FOR VLGC / LPG
MASTER – Chief Engineer
With 12-24 Months rank experience
CH OFFICER
With 12 Months rank experience
3RD OFFICER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
GEARED BULK CARRIER
CHIEF ENGINEER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
CHIEF OFFICER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
GEARLESS BULK CARRIER
CHIEF OFFICER
CHIEF ENGINEER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
2ND ENGINEER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
3RD ENGINEER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
FEEDER CONTAINER
CHIEF ENGINEER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
3RD ENGINEER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
3RD OFFICER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
MASTER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
CONTAINER (TEU 5000) – WITH US VISA
ETO
With 12-24 Months rank experience
3RD OFFICER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
2ND OFFICER
With 6-12 Months rank experience
REQUIREMENT | WHITE COC ONLY
SEND YOUR CV TO
+91 9136009837
resume@pg-maritime.com
Pg maritime
YOUR JOURNEY. OUR COMMITMENT.
SAFETY • RELIABILITY • EXCELLENCE


KIWA
SAIL YOUR CAREER WITH KIWA
GROW • EXCEL • SUCCEED
WE ARE HIRING!
FOR OUR
MR TANKER FLEET
POSITIONS AVAILABLE
3RD OFFICER
CHIEF ENGINEER
2ND ENGINEER
3RD ENGINEER
4TH ENGINEER
REQUIREMENTS
Minimum 12 months' experience in the same rank
White COC only
All STCW certificates must be valid
Good track record and professional attitude
JOIN OUR PROFESSIONAL TEAM & GROW WITH US!
+91 8544883611
+91 7347291211
recruitment@kiwashipping.com
KIWA SHIPPING LLP
RPSL No.: MUM 162260
SAFETY FIRST
PEOPLE FOCUSED
GLOBAL PRESENCE
TRUST & RELIABILITY


CASCADE MARITIME
Cascade Maritime Pvt Ltd
WE ARE HIRING!
JOIN OUR TEAM
4th ENGINEER
FOR
5000 GRT LPG TANKER
SALARY
USD 2000-2500/-
RANK EXPERIENCE
ON LPG TANKER
COC ACCEPTED
ANY COC ACCEPTED
JOIN IMMEDIATELY
SAIL WITH US TOWARDS A BETTER FUTURE
CONTACT US
+91 95016 27835
EMAIL US
ssharma@cascadesm.com
SAFETY • RELIABILITY • EXCELLENCE • TEAMWORK

ALL MARINE EXPERTS

We kindly welcome you to write your expertise in our weekly magazine.

ALL SAILING SEAFARERS

The sea has taught you valuable lessons, created unforgettable memories, and shaped the person you are today.

Your story could inspire, educate, and help fellow seafarers around the world.

WRITE TO US
mu@marinersupdate.com

WHATSAPP
+91 7200 163695

TOGETHER, LET'S BUILD A STRONGER MARITIME COMMUNITY

FINAL THOUGHTS

EXCELLENCE AT SEA IS BUILT THROUGH PREPARATION, DISCIPLINE, AND TEAMWORK.

EVERY INSPECTION PASSED, RISK MANAGED, AND PROCEDURE FOLLOWED STRENGTHENS THE MARITIME INDUSTRY AS A WHOLE.

THANK YOU FOR READING THIS WEEK'S EDITION.

STAY PROACTIVE, STAY PROFESSIONAL, AND KEEP RAISING THE STANDARD.

UNTIL NEXT TIME, SAFE SAILING AND CALM SEAS.

30 June 2026